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 1  J  Pila ,  ‘ Intellectual Property as a Case Study in Europeanization: Methodological Th emes 
and Context ’ in  A  Ohly and  J  Pila (eds),  Th e Europeanization of Intellectual Property Law , 
 Oxford University Press ,  Oxford  2013 ,  p 3 . 
 2  Additionally, Article 36 states that the protection of industrial and commercial property could 
be regarded as exceptions for the prohibition of restrictions to the freedom of movement of 
goods. 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Th e eff ect of European Union law on intellectual property (IP) law in the United 
Kingdom has been profound. Th ere is no area of IP law that does not feature 
EU legislation or CJEU case law. In fact, it may be the most  ‘ Europeanised ’ 
area of private law. 1 For this reason,  ‘ Brexit ’ will undoubtedly have a massive 
impact on the current IP framework in the UK. A clear picture of the post-Brexit 
IP landscape, however, can only be drawn once we know the outcome of the 
negotiations pursuant to the Article 50 TEU procedure. Our intention with this 
chapter is to give an overview of the current state of play in terms of EU law ’ s 
impact on IP law, and to consider the most likely outcome of Brexit on IP law 
in the UK. 
 At the outset, we must emphasise that the United Kingdom ’ s  ‘ exiting ’ of the 
European Union will primarily aff ect IP laws, currently valid in the UK, that derive 
from EU measures. Long before the UK joined the then European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1973 it had established its own national jurisdiction to 
grant, for example, trade marks and patents, and it will continue to possess this 
jurisdiction, post-Brexit. Moreover, the UK can claim an indigenous tradition 
of copyright legislation going back to the Statute of Anne in 1710. Finally, the 
UK is a signatory to several measures which have been negotiated and agreed 
outside of the European Union, and which need to be distinguished from EU 
measures. For instance, there is the UPOV Convention establishing a  sui generis 
right for plant varieties, as well as the European Patent Convention (EPC) which 
provides for a centralised system for granting European patents (EPs). Th ese 
measures operate outside the ambit of the European Union and Brexit will not 
directly aff ect the UK ’ s involvement in these measures. With this chapter, we aim 
to explain what areas  will be aff ected by Brexit, and which ones will not. 
 2. THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN IP LAW 
 Th e Europeanisation of intellectual property via EU law is a history of ever-
growing integration. Yet, the Treaty of Rome did not bestow any relevant 
legislative competence to the European Economic Community (EEC). Th e 
Treaty rather stipulated that what would become EU law would not  ‘ prejudice the 
system existing in Member States in respect of property ’ within its Article 222. 2 
Th is meant that eff orts to harmonise national IP laws in Europe took place at 
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 3  G  Tritton ,  Tritton on Intellectual Property in Europe ,  4th edn ,  Sweet  & Maxwell ,  London 
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patent laws (see eg UK Patents Act 1977, section 130(7));  ‘ Resolution on the Adjustment of 
National Patent Law Records of the Luxembourg Conference on the Community patent 1975 ’ 
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Publications of the European Communities, 1982) p 332. 
 5  Case 24/67 ,  Parke, Davis and Co v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm , 
 ECLI:EU:C:1968:11, 55, 71 . 
 6  T ritton , above n 3, para 1-039. 
 7  P ila , above n 1, p 10. 
 8  P  Groves ,  T  Martinoi ,  C  Mishkin and  J Richards ,  Intellectual Property and the Internal 
Market of the European Community ,  Graham  & Trotman ,  London  1993 ,  p 5 ; T ritton , above 
n 3, para 1-039. 
 9  See eg  Case 56 and 58/64 ,  Consten SaRL and Grundig Verkaufs GmbH v Comm , 
 ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 ;  Parke, Davis and Co v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and 
Centrafarm , above n 5. 
 10  T ritton , above n 3, para 1-039. 
 11  Article 100 EEC; Article 95 EC. 
 12  Case C-376/98 ,  Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union ,  ECLI:EU:C:2000:544 , paras 83 – 84. 
 13  UK adoption of a Directive with regard to trade secrets was envisaged in 2017 – 18 but the 
UK may not bring it into force if Brexit occurs:  < http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/
intellectual-property/trade-secrets_en > . 
the international level through multilateral measures. 3 One such measure was 
the Community Patent Convention of 1975 which was devised as a special 
agreement between Member States of the then EEC. 4 
 Th e European Court of Justice, however, perceived that national rules 
for IP protection and their discrepancies were capable of creating obstacles 
to fundamental principles of the EEC Treaties, like freedom of movement of 
goods or competition. 5 Th ereaft er the scope for scrutiny under rules of the 
Treaty was enabled by distinguishing between the existence of IP rights which 
were governed by national law and their exercise, thus delineating the future 
relationship between EU law and national IP rights. 6 In due course, the exercise 
of IP rights would fall under the shared scrutiny of the Union and Member 
States. 7 Initially, it was perceived that national rules on intellectual property 
would confl ict with the competition rules in the Treaty, 8 as early cases indicated. 9 
Th e focus, however, soon shift ed to the adverse eff ects of intellectual property 
rights on the free movement of goods which led to the development of the rules 
on exhaustion of IP rights by the CJEU. 10 
 Additionally, the discrepancies between Treaty principles and national 
IP rights led the European Commission to harmonise national IP laws via 
Directives based on Article 114(1) TFEU and its predecessor, 11 which provided 
that the Union may provide legislation for the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market. 12 Directives have been used to harmonise national IP laws 
on trade marks, copyright (and related rights), registered designs and, in the 
patent area, with regards to biotechnology inventions. 13 
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See further the contribution by  T Horsley (Ch 4) in this edited collection. 
 Th ese eff orts to harmonise national IP laws have additionally been 
supplemented by unitary EU wide rights through regulations. 14 Such measures 
were initially based on Article 352 TFEU 15 which required a unanimous vote of 
the Council. Th e inception of the Lisbon Treaty introduced Article 118 TFEU 
which allows the introduction of EU-wide IP rights. Currently, there are EU 
Regulations with regards to EU trade mark rights, registered and unregistered 
Community design rights, protected geographical indications and protected 
designations of origin, Community plant variety rights and supplementary 
protection certifi cates (SPCs). 
 One fi nal thing is worth noting: the impact of EU law on national IP rights 
varies from right to right. Th e eff ect on design and trade mark law has been 
profound since both areas have been harmonised via Directives and the creation 
of unitary rights. Copyright law has fared less harmoniously but the impact has 
still been considerable. Patents were, for many years, the least aff ected IP right, 
but over the past two decades there has been a dramatic increase in patent-
related EU legislation, culminating in the Regulation on the European patent 
with unitary eff ect. 
 Th e future framework of intellectual property law in the UK will depend 
on the kind of Brexit that will occur. A so-called hard Brexit, which currently 
appears to be the UK government ’ s line, would sever all links with the EU 
 acquis . However, the February 2017 Government ’ s White Paper on the Great 
Repeal Bill states that  ‘ historic CJEU case law be given the same binding, or 
precedent, status in our courts as decisions of our own Supreme Court. ’ 16 Th e 
malleability of the common law system will enable UK courts to continue to 
apply EU-derived principles like  ‘ intellectual creation ’ within UK copyright law 
until new UK legislation provides otherwise. However, any future CJEU case 
law would not have to be followed, though it can be anticipated that UK courts 
would fi nd CJEU judgments persuasive, similar to the current practice with 
regards to the decisions of the EPO Board of Appeals. 17  ‘ Soft  Brexit ’, ie where the 
UK stays within the European Economic Area (EEA), would mean that much of 
EU IP Law would remain valid. 
 2.1. TRADE MARKS 
 Of all IP rights, EU law has had the most profound impact on trade mark law. 
Th e activity by the Union in this fi eld of IP can be explained by the Union ’ s goal 
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 19  A  von M ü hlendahl ,  D  Botis ,  S  Maniatis and  I  Wiseman ,  Trade Mark Law in Europe , 
 3rd edn ,  Oxford University Press, Oxford  2016 , para 2.07. 
 20  First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the 
Member States relating to trade marks [ 1989 ]  OJ L40 . 
 21  Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark 
[ 2009 ]  OJ L78/1 , Recital 4. 
 22  Memorandum on the Creation of an EEC Trade Mark, Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Supplement 8/76, para 34. 
 23  Article 1(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community 
trade mark [ 2009 ]  OJ L78/1 . 
 24  G Dinwoodie ,  ‘ Th e Europeanisation of Trade Mark Law ’ Law ’ in O hly and P ila, above n 1, 
p 91. 
to establish a single market. 18 Trade marks became a prime harmonising area 
in the context of marketing goods and services throughout the single market. 19 
In 1989 the fi rst Trade Marks Directive was brought forward with the aim of 
harmonising trade mark law within EU Member States. 20 Th e United Kingdom 
implemented the Directive with the UK Trade Marks Act 1994. 
 Th e EU, however, considered that the mere approximation of national laws 
would not eliminate the barriers of territoriality. 21 To ensure the free movement 
of branded goods the Community Trade Mark was initiated by the European 
Commission. 22 Th e Community Trade Mark Regulation created a unitary right  – 
the Community Trade Mark  – which would be valid in all EU Member States. 
Following the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Community Trade 
Mark Regulation was substituted with the EU Trade Mark Regulation and 
Community Trade Marks were relabelled as EU Trade Marks. 
 2.1.1. EU Trade Marks and CJEU Jurisprudence 
 EU Trade Marks are granted by the EU IP Offi  ce (formerly, the Offi  ce for the 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market, OHIM) in Alicante. Th e EU Trade Mark 
has unitary eff ect in all EU Member States and can only be assigned and licensed 
as a whole. 23 Th e enforcement of such EU Trade Marks is conducted by national 
courts as courts of the EU with the possibility of the General Court and the 
European Court of Justice being involved. Indeed, the majority of cases of the 
CJEU in the fi eld of intellectual property law are trade mark cases. 24 
 European courts are directly involved in the adjudication of EU Trade Marks 
stemming from appeals from the EUIPO. In addition, national courts frequently 
seek CJEU guidance on interpreting provision deriving from the TM Directive 
through preliminary rulings pursuant to Article 267 TFEU. Th e fact that the 
substantial provisions of both the Directive and Regulation correspond to one 
another makes case law based on the Directive relevant for the interpretation 
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 27  Case C-486/07 ,  L ’ Or é al SA v Bellure NV ,  ECLI:EU:C:2009:378 . 
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of provisions of the Regulation and vice versa, thus increasing the harmonising 
eff ect. 25 
 In practice, the decisions of the European courts on trade mark matters 
have not always been welcomed by national courts. Some UK IP practitioners 
and judges consider that the European Courts, as generalist courts, do not have 
the expertise to decide on a complex, specialist matter like trade mark law. UK 
judicial discontentment can be seen with the High Court decision, following 
a CJEU reference, in  Arsenal v Reed (2002) 26 and similarly, at the Court of 
Appeal level in  L ’ Or é al v Bellure (2009). 27 Central to the  L ’ Or é al case was the 
question of whether Bellure was taking unfair advantage of the reputation or the 
distinctiveness of L ’ Or é al ’ s marks. Th e CJEU held that this would occur when 
the alleged infringer was  ‘ riding on the coattails ’ of the famous mark, noting that 
such use of the mark would be uncompensated. Th e CJEU ’ s interpretation of the 
respective provisions left  the UK courts with no other avenue but a fi nding of 
infringement, despite concerns about the wider impact of the decision. Indeed, 
the CJEU ’ s de facto extension of trade mark protection to the wider  ‘ brand ’ has 
received substantial academic criticism. 28 
 2.1.2. Th e Impact of Brexit 
 Article 1(2) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation prescribes that the unitary 
character of the EU Trade Mark shall have equal eff ect within the Union. A hard 
Brexit will mean that EU trade marks granted by the EUIPO will have no eff ect 
within the United Kingdom. Th e impact of this will be signifi cant. Currently, 
there are millions of EU Trade Marks registered at the EUIPO. Moreover, the 
United Kingdom had, along with Germany, the highest number of applications 
of EU Trade Marks in the year 2015 according to Eurostat. 29 Th e fate of these 
registrations remains unclear and would largely depend on any agreement 
between the UK and the remaining EU Member States. In August 2016, the 
Chartered Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys (CITMA) provided a list of seven 
options that could apply post-Brexit. 30 
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 32  Legislating for the United Kingdom ’ s withdrawal from the European Union , above n 16. 
 Th e  Jersey option provides that the UK would unilaterally declare EU Trade 
Marks to have eff ect within the territory of the United Kingdom through an 
accompanying piece of legislation. Th is eff ect would be acknowledged by both 
the UK Intellectual Property Offi  ce (UK IPO) and UK courts. Th e  UKplus option 
foresees an amendment of Article 1(2) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation. Rather 
than extending to the territories of Union Member States the eff ect of such a 
trade mark would extend to the UK and potentially other non-EU European 
Countries. Th e  Montenegro option envisages that all existing EU Trade Mark 
registrations would be entered automatically entered within the UK ’ s trade 
mark register. Th e  Tuvalu model follows basically the Montenegro model with 
the distinction that registration of the EU Trade mark in the UK registry would 
be dependent on the owner ’ s positive decision to extend the protection to the 
UK. Th e  Veto model resembles the Tuvalu option but provides the UK IPO 
with the option to refuse registration of the mark in question. Th e  Republic 
of Ireland option provides EU Trade Mark owners with the option to create a 
corresponding UK trade mark registration when renewing the registration at the 
EUIPO or another cut-off  date aft er Brexit. Finally, the  Conversion model would 
replicate the currently used system that applies where current EU Trade Marks 
are converted into national trade mark registrations. 31 Th is is, for instance, done 
where an application for an EU Trade Mark is not possible because of an earlier 
right in just one EU Member State prohibiting registration with an EU Trade 
mark with unitary eff ect. With regard to applying this framework to the post-
Brexit scenario, applications would undergo full examination but would be able 
to retain their initial priority date at the EUIPO. 
 ‘ Hard Brexit ’ would mean that national trade mark law (statutory provisions) 
would not have to be amended. Th e proposed Great Repeal Bill would mean that 
the current statutory trade mark law would remain as it is but Parliament would 
be able to amend the law as it sees fi t. Importantly, however, the link to the EU 
 acquis and the adjudication of the CJEU would be severed. By contrast,  ‘ Soft  
Brexit ’ and EEA membership would not change much with regard to UK trade 
mark law as the Trade Marks Directive would still apply. It is as yet unclear as 
to which option will be taken. Th e current UK White Paper on the Great Repeal 
Bill states that the case law of the CJEU prior to Brexit will have the same status 
as UK Supreme Court cases within the UK legal system, 32 but subsequent case 
law of the CJEU would no longer be binding on the UK. 
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 35  Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the 
legal protection of designs [ 1998 ]  OJ L289 , Recital 7. 
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 OJ L3/1 . Article 11(1). 
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 2.2. DESIGNS 
 As with trade mark law, design law in the UK is heavily infl uenced by EU law. 
However, design protection is multi-layered: designs can be protected through 
registration at the EU or UK levels; but protection is also available through 
unregistered design rights, again at both the EU and UK levels. Unitary EU rights 
are available for registered and unregistered designs (ie Community registered 
designs and Community unregistered designs), with registrations occurring at 
the EUIPO. 33 National laws in EU Member States with regard to registered rights 
were harmonised through the Design Directive 34 which was implemented in the 
UK through an amendment of the Registered Designs Act 1949. Th e Directive, 
however, left  the regime of national unregistered design rights untouched. 35 UK 
unregistered designs are legislated within Part III of the Copyright, Design and 
Patents Act 1988 (CDPA 1988). Th is somewhat complex framework of design 
protection 36 means that only the law of registered designs is fully Europeanised, 
and the rules for EU and national unregistered designs can vary. 
 Th e parallel to the situation under trade mark law means that similar 
considerations and options for the post-Brexit scenario are relevant for the 
protection of Community registered designs. Hence, CITMA have put forward 
a similar scenario to the one outlined above for trade marks with regards to 
registered EU designs. 37 Th e situation is, however, diff erent for unregistered 
Community designs, where the right subsists automatically when it is fi rst 
made available in the EU. 38 Post-Brexit, an EU unregistered design right could 
in theory be accepted as a UK unregistered design right. Th ere are diffi  culties 
with this, however, due to diff erences between the regimes of protection of 
unregistered designs in the EU and the UK. For instance, the UK right lasts 
signifi cantly longer (15 years in comparison to three years), and contrary to the 
unregistered Community design, its UK counterpart does not protect surface 
decoration. 39 Th erefore, further considerations will be required in this fi eld to 
develop adequate post-Brexit protection. 
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 41  Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of geographical 
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 OJ L93/12 , Article 13(1). 
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 2.3. GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 
 A related fi eld to IP is the protection provided to geographical indications 
and designations of origin. Th ese two fi elds aim to protect agricultural 
products and foodstuff s manufactured within a certain locality which possess 
certain characteristics. Both of these measures are currently based on an EU 
Regulation. 40 Th e protection is granted, inter alia, against any false or misleading 
use of the indication. 41 Products such as Champagne, Roquefort cheese, Bavarian 
Beer and Parma ham are protected by these measures. Th e UK currently has 
several products registered under this framework such as Welsh Lamb, Stilton 
Blue and White Cheeses, Cornish Pasties and the Melton Mowbray Pork Pie. 42 
 Aft er Brexit, neither Protected Geographical Indications (PGI) nor Protected 
Designations of Origin (PDOs) would have eff ect in the United Kingdom 
(similar to the situation with EU Trade Marks). Th is has led to fears that British 
producers could be free to use previously protected names. 43 Already registered 
UK products, however, would ironically not lose their registration as PGIs or 
PDO in the EU. Th is is because the framework established by the Regulation is 
open for products from non-EU Member States. 
 A form of supplementary protection in this area could be provided by the 
law of passing off  (an aspect of the law of torts). Th is would bring the UK back 
to the situation prior to the introduction of the Regulation on PGIs and PDOs, 
whereby an extended from of passing off  allowed groups of producers to fi le an 
action against misrepresentation by other traders. For instance, the producers 
of Champagne, that were entitled to use the term under French law, were able 
to successfully take action in the UK against producers labelling their beverage 
Spanish Champagne. 44 
 Nevertheless, passing off  would not provide the same level of protection 
as the current system. GIs provide protection not just against confusingly 
similar designations but also where association is merely evoked. Conversely, a 
successful claim of passing off  would need to demonstrate a misrepresentation, 
and that consumers would rely on such misrepresentation when purchasing the 
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goods of the defendant. 45 Th e prospect of divergent levels of protection post-
Brexit means that a negotiated arrangement as to what happens with currently 
protected GIs is necessary. 
 Indeed, any post-Brexit deal between the UK and the EU would very likely 
deal with the issue of currently protected PGIs and PDOs. For one thing, the 
United Kingdom is required to provide some form of protection owing to 
its membership at the World Trade Organization. Th e WTO ’ s Agreement on 
Trade related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which mandates 
minimum standards of IP protection, provides in its Article 22 that legal 
means to protect interested parties against misleading uses must be provided 
by WTO member states. Aside from this, any future deal with the European 
Union will necessarily involve protections of PGIs and PDOs. Th e EU places 
great importance on their protection within their trade negotiations as recently 
observed during discussions over the CETA treaty between the EU and Canada. 46 
 2.4. COPYRIGHT 
 Unlike trade mark law, there is no overarching single regulatory system for EU 
copyright. Nonetheless, major elements of copyright law have been harmonised 
in the EU via national implementation of the following 10 EU Directives: 
 –  Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society ( ‘ InfoSoc Directive ’ ). 47 
 –  Directive on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to 
copyright in the fi eld of intellectual property ( ‘ Rental and Lending Directive ’ ). 48 
 –  Directive on the resale right for the benefi t of the author of an original work of 
art ( ‘ Resale Right Directive ’ ). 49 
 –  Directive on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights 
related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission 
( ‘ Satellite and Cable Directive ’ ). 50 
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 53  Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
legal protection of databases [ 1996 ]  OJ L77/20 . 
 54  Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 
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 –  Directive on the legal protection of computer programs ( ‘ Soft ware Directive ’ ). 51 
 –  Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights ( ‘ IPRED ’ ). 52 
 –  Directive on the legal protection of databases ( ‘ Database Directive ’ ). 53 
 –  Directive on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights 
amending the previous 2006 Directive ( ‘ Term Directive ’ ). 54 
 –  Directive on certain permitted uses of orphan works ( ‘ Orphan Works 
Directive ’ ). 55 
 –  Directive on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-
territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal 
market ( ‘ CRM Directive ’ ). 
 Th ere is insuffi  cient space here to consider all of these legal areas. In the context 
of Brexit the EU-specifi c rights are of particular interest. One is the  sui generis 
right for databases. 56 In a hard Brexit scenario, this EU right would no longer 
be binding in the UK. Post-Brexit, the UK could legislate on a national basis to 
establish a UK  sui generis right; or alternatively, the courts may fall back on, or 
expand upon, the UK ’ s traditional form of protection of databases as literary 
works under copyright. 57 Another example of an EU-specifi c right is the artist ’ s 
resale right. 58 Th is right entitles authors of original works of art to a royalty 
each time one of their works is resold through an art market professional. Th is 
too would cease to be binding, post-Brexit, and the UK would need to legislate 
to bring in a UK equivalent right (if the UK Government wanted this form of 
protection to continue). 
 Yet another interesting point concerns the relevance of the case law of the 
CJEU. 59 Th is body of case law, post-Brexit, will in principle cease to be binding 
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on the UK (unless there is a transitional or longer-term agreement between 
the UK and the EU that provides for the compulsory jurisdiction of the CJEU 
on copyright). Of particular signifi cance is the EU originality threshold of 
 ‘ author ’ s own intellectual creation ’  – as put forward by the CJEU in  Infopaq 
as the standard for all copyright works. 60 Since that 2009 case, this test has 
displaced the traditional UK standard of  ‘ skill, labour and judgment ’ (though the 
impact of this in practice has not been dramatic). 61 It is unknown at this stage 
whether the UK courts will revert to the old understanding of the originality 
test. Similarly, regarding the CJEU ’ s defi nition of parody for the purpose of 
exceptions and limitations, as expressed in the  Deckmyn case, this will no longer 
be binding on the UK, post-Brexit. 62 Th e UK courts could therefore develop 
their own understanding of parody in the context of the fair dealing exception. 
However, the malleability of the common law means that the UK courts will be 
free to continue to apply the EU-derived tests of originality and parody, post-
Brexit, even if they are no longer bound by CJEU rulings on copyright matters. 
Indeed, they may begin to develop these tests in ways that diff er from the CJEU ’ s 
approach. 
 2.5. PATENTS 
 Historically, patent law has not been harmonised within the EU. Th e European 
Patent Convention (EPC)  – agreed in 1973  – exists outside the Union and has a 
wider membership, including Turkey, Iceland and Switzerland as well as several 
other non-EU territories. Under the EPC, European patents (EPs) are fi led, 
prosecuted and administered at the European Patent Offi  ce (EPO) in Munich. 
 Even though the primary governing law  – the EPC  – exists outside of the 
EU ’ s authority, the EU has, in fact, legislated in several areas relating to patents. 
Th e following pieces of EU legislation have a direct impact on patents: 
 –  Directive 98/44/EC (biotechnological inventions); 63 
 –  Regulation 2100/94 (plant variety rights); 64 
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enforcement of intellectual property rights [ 2004 ]  OJ L195 . 
 66  Regulation (EC) no 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 
concerning the supplementary protection certifi cate for medicinal products [ 2009 ]  OJ L152 . 
 67  Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on 
the Community code relating to veterinary medicinal products [ 2001 ]  OJ L118 . 
 68  Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on 
the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use [ 2001 ]  OJ L311 . 
 69  Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
legal protection of computer programs [ 2009 ]  O J L111 . 
 70  Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the 
applicable translation arrangements [2012] OJ L361. 
 71  Case C-34/10 ,  Br ü stle v Greenpeace ,  ECLI:EU:C:2011:669 . 
 –  Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC; 65 
 –  Regulation 469/2009/EC (SPCs for medicinal products); 66 
 –  Directive 2001/82/EC (veterinary medicinal products); 67 
 –  Directive 2001/83/EC (medical products for human use); 68 
 –  Directive 2009/24/EC (computer programs); 69 
 –  Regulation 1257/2012 (UP Regulation). 70 
 For present purposes, it is important to concentrate on two elements of the 
current system: (1) the jurisprudence of the CJEU in the above areas, most 
notably in the areas of biotechnology, supplementary protection certifi cates 
(SPCs) and enforcement; and (2) the Unifi ed Patent Court and Unitary Patent  – 
a new reformed patent enforcement system for participating EU Member States. 
 2.5.1. CJEU Jurisprudence on Patent-Related Matters 
 Given the limited nature of the above Regulations and Directives, the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU in patent matters is surprisingly wide-ranging. It is 
not the intention of this part of the chapter to give an authoritative overview of 
CJEU patent case law  – instead, three important cases in three diff erent areas 
of EU law are highlighted here to show the breadth of the CJEU ’ s jurisdiction. 
 2.5.1.1. Th e Biotechnology Directive (98/44/EC) 
 Th e Biotech Directive establishes the rules for the patenting of biotechnological 
inventions. It rules out patentability for inventions that involve  ‘ uses of human 
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes ’. However, the legislators did 
not give an answer to the politically loaded question  – exactly what constitutes 
a  ‘ human embryo ’ ? Th us, in the  Br ü stle case the CJEU had to answer a series 
of questions on the meaning of human embryo in the context of patenting. 71 
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 72  Case C 631/13 ,  Arne Forsgren v  Ö sterreichisches Patentamt ,  ECLI:EU:C:2015:13 . 
Th e CJEU ruled in 2011 that Article 6(2)(c) of the Biotech Directive must be 
interpreted as meaning that: 
 ‘ Th e use of human embryos for scientifi c research purposes is not patentable. A  ‘ human 
embryo ’ within the meaning of Union law is any human ovum aft er fertilisation or 
any human ovum not fertilised but which, through the eff ect of the technique used 
to obtain it, is capable of commencing the process of development of a human being. ’ 
 It is for the referring court to ascertain, in the light of scientifi c developments, 
whether a stem cell obtained from a human embryo at the blastocyst stage 
constitutes a  ‘ human embryo ’ within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of the 
Biotech Directive. 
 2.5.1.2. Regulation 469/2009/EC (SPCs for Medicinal Products) 
 Th is Regulation covers the granting of SPCs  – eff ectively, extending the life of 
the patent  – where there was a delay in granting the marketing authorisation for 
a patented medicine. In the case of  Arne Forsgren , 72 the limits of SPC protection 
were examined by the CJEU. In the case, Protein D was present in a vaccine 
for paediatric use  – Synfl orix  – where it was a carrier protein, conjugated by 
covalent bonds. However, the SPC application was for Protein D per se, not in the 
conjugated form found in Synfl orix. Th e application for the SPC was therefore 
rejected by the Austrian national authority on the basis that Protein D is not 
present in Synfl orix other than as a conjugate of other active ingredients as well 
as the fact that in Synfl orix it is an excipient. Th e CJEU had to consider: 
 (1) whether an SPC could be obtained in respect to a product per se in  ‘ separate ’ 
form when the marketing authorisation was for a medicine in which the product is 
covalently bonded to other ingredients; and 
 (2) whether the SPC could rely on a marketing authorisation which only described 
the product as a  ‘ carrier protein ’ and did not provide any information about an 
independent therapeutic eff ect 
 Th e CJEU found in 2015 that the  ‘ covalent bonding ’ issue should not prevent 
the granting of an SPC. On the issue of whether the marketing authorisation 
was adequate to support the grant of the SPC, the Court stated that for 
Protein D to be an  ‘ active ingredient ’ as required by the Regulation it must 
produce  ‘ a pharmacological, immunological or metabolic action of its own 
which is covered by the therapeutic indications of the marketing authorisation ’. 
It left  that determination  – whether to grant the SPC  – to the referring court. 
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 73  Case C-367/15 ,  OTK v SFP ,  ECLI:EU:C:2017:36 . 
 74  Text of the European Patent Convention, of 5 October 1973, as revised by the Act revising 
Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991, and the Act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000, 
available at  < http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/00E0CD7FD461C0D
5C1257C060050C376/$File/EPC_15th_edition_2013.pdf> . Also accessible at  < http://www.
epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2010/d/index.html > . 
 75  Even though at present a patentee can apply to the EPO for an EP with a single application in 
1 of the 3 offi  cial EPO languages, once granted a patent must be fi led and translated into the 
other 2 offi  cial EPO languages. See also Th e Agreement on the application of Article 65 of the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents agreed on 17 October 2000 (see OJ EPO 549 
(2001)) (hereaft er known as the London Agreement)  – available at  < http://documents.epo.
org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/7FD20618D28E9FBFC125743900678657/$File/London_
Agreement.pdf > . 
 76  See generally EPO,  Patent Litigation in Europe  – An overview of national law and practice in 
the EPC contracting states (2013),  < https://www.epo.org/learning-events/materials/litigation.
html > . 
 77  K  Cremers ,  M  Ernicke ,  D  Harhoff ,  C  Helmers ,  G  Licht ,  L  Mcdonagh ,  I  Rudyk , 
 P  Schliessler ,  C  Schneider and  N  Van Zeebroek ,  ‘ Patent Litigation in Europe ’ ( 2013 ) 
 ZEW Discussion Paper No  13 – 07 ,  pp 1 – 3 . 
 2.5.1.3. Th e Enforcement Directive (2004/48/EC) 
 Th e Enforcement Directive governs the rules for enforcing intellectual property 
in the courts of the EU Member States. In the  OTK case the operative question 
was as follows: does the Enforcement Directive prevent Member States from 
providing in their legislation the possibility to award punitive damages in IP 
cases ? 73 Th e Polish Supreme Court sought guidance from the CJEU. Th e CJEU 
in 2017 ruled that the fact that Directive 2004/48 does not entail an obligation 
on the Member States to provide for  ‘ punitive ’ damages cannot be interpreted as 
a prohibition on introducing such a measure. 
 2.5.2. Th e Unifi ed Patent Court (UPC) 
 Although the grant of patents takes place at a centralised level  – at the EPO  – 
European patent litigation involving European patents (EPs) is actually 
undertaken on a largely national basis. 74 Th e reason is that EPs must be 
validated  – and subsequently, litigated  – within national jurisdictions. 75 
National courts, therefore, have the ability to issue binding rulings concerning 
patent infringement within their national territories, and they also may consider 
questions of patent validity  – although the EPO retains the fi nal say on validity 
via its patent opposition service. 76 Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for national 
patent litigation to take place at the same time as parallel EPO opposition 
proceedings; and the lengthy backlog at the EPO means that national courts 
sometimes rule on questions of validity and infringement before the EPO Board 
of Appeals has reached a fi nal decision regarding validity. 77 Th is has led in 
some cases to fragmentation of outcomes on validity and infringement across 
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 78  Ibid, pp 1 – 5. 
 79  Agreement on a Unifi ed Patent Court (Th e UPC Agreement) [2013] OJ C175/1, accessible at 
 < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:175:0001:0040:EN:PDF > . 
 80  J  Pila ,  ‘ Th e European Patent: An Old and Vexing Problem ’ ( 2013 )  62  International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly  917, 917 – 921 . See also  B  van Pottesberghe ,  Lost Property: Th e 
European Patent System and why it Doesn ’ t Work ( Bruegel  Blueprint Series ,  2009 ) available at 
 < http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/patents_BP_050609.pdf > . 
 81  Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of 
unitary patent protection (UP Regulation), [2012] OJ L361/1 and Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements 
(Translation Regulation) [2012] OJ L361/89. For a further explanation of the changes, see the 
EPO website:  < http://www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary.html> . See also  R  Romandini and 
 A  Klicznik ,  ‘ Th e Territoriality Principle and Transnational Use of Patented Inventions   – 
the Wider Reach of a Unitary Patent and the Role of the CJEU ’ ( 2013 )  44  International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law  524 – 540 ; and  M  Brandi-Dohrn ,  ‘ Some 
Critical Observations on Competence and Procedure of the Unifi ed Patent Court ’ ( 2012 ) 
 43  International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law  372 – 389 . 
 82  Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of 
unitary patent protection (UP Regulation), [2012] OJ L361/1 and Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements 
(Translation Regulation) [2012] OJ L361/89. 
 83  R  Hilty ,  ‘ Th e Unitary Patent Package: Twelve Reasons for Concern ’ ( 2012 )  41  CIPA Journal 
 553 – 555 . 
 84  T  Cook ,  ‘ Th e Progress to Date on the Unitary European Patent and the Unifi ed Patent Court 
for Europe ’ ( 2013 )  18  Journal of Intellectual Property Rights  584, 586 . 
EU jurisdictions, something that impacts upon the single market and raises 
competition issues. 78 
 To try to resolve these issues, on 19 February 2013 the UK and 24 other 
countries signed an intergovernmental agreement (the UPC Agreement) to 
create a Unifi ed Patent Court (UPC), which will be a new specialist patents court 
common to participating states. 79 Overall, the package of measures is designed 
to establish and enforce unitary patent protection within the European Union, 80 
with the ultimate ambition of unifying the European patent system as much as 
possible. 81 
 In addition to the UPC Agreement, the new reform measures also include 
two EU Regulations which establish the European Patent with Unitary eff ect  – 
also known as the Unitary Patent (UP)  – and the associated translation 
arrangements. 82 Th e application and grant process for the UP will be the same as 
for the regular European patents (EPs); the option for unitary protection across 
participating EU Member States comes post-grant. 83 Importantly, the UPC will 
not only hear disputes regarding the validity and infringement of the new UPs 
but also existing and prospective EPs (subject to the transition period). 84 
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 85  Articles 2 and 142 EPC. 
 86  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, entered into force on 
1 December 2009 [2007] OJ C306. 
 87  Article 18(2) UP Regulation and Article 7(2) Translation Regulation. 
 88  L  Mcdonagh ,  European Patent Litigation in the Shadow of the Unifi ed Patent Court ,  Edward 
Elgar ,  Cheltenham ,  2016 ,  pp 1 – 16 . See also  L  Mcdonagh ,  ‘ Exploring Perspectives of the 
Unifi ed Patent Court and the Unitary Patent within the Business and Legal Communities ’ 
 A Report Commissioned by the UK Intellectual Property Offi  ce ( July 2014 ), available at 
 < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/exploring-perspectives-of-the-up-and-upc > . 
 89  See also Article 1(2) UPC Agreement and Article 267 Consolidated version of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/01. 
 90  Opinion 1/09 [2011] OJ C211/28. 
 91  R  Romandini and  A  Klicznik ,  ‘ Th e Territoriality Principle and Transnational Use of 
Patented Inventions  – the Wider Reach of a Unitary Patent and the Role of the CJEU ’ ( 2013 ) 
 44  International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law  524, 524 – 529 . 
 2.5.3. Th e Legal Sources of the Unifi ed Patent Court and the UPC 
 Legally, the existence of the Unitary Patent is enabled by a longstanding option 
under the EPC allowing the validation of patents on a supranational basis. 85 Th e 
EU Regulations were passed into law via the system of enhanced cooperation as 
reformed by the Lisbon Treaty. 86 
 Th e EU Regulations are technically already in force. 87 However, they will 
apply only once the UPC Agreement is ratifi ed by the requisite 3  + 10 countries, 
ie Germany, France and the UK plus 10 more signatory states. As of March 
2017, this ratifi cation has yet to take place. Until the Brexit referendum, the UK 
seemed to be well on the way to full ratifi cation of the UPC. Indeed, for the past 
four years the UK Government has been making plans to host one of the new 
Court ’ s central divisions in Aldgate, east London, where a building has already 
been leased in preparation for the new Court ’ s establishment and mock trials 
have taken place. 88 
 What is crucial in the Brexit context is that even though the UPC will have its 
own jurisdiction to rule with respect to most patent issues  – like the infringement 
of patented drugs  – it must defer to the CJEU in a small number of areas of EU law, 
arising under the areas considered earlier, such as biotechnology, enforcement 
or matters relating to Supplementary Protection Certifi cates. Under Article 21 of 
the UPC Agreement a referral can be made by the UPC to the CJEU in much the 
same way as an EU Member State national court would make such a referral. 89 
In line with this, the CJEU in Opinion 1/09 held that only states that accept the 
supremacy of EU law and the jurisdiction of the CJEU may sign up. 90 Th us, 
the CJEU will undoubtedly have some judicial input within the UPC system, 
though every eff ort has seemingly been made by the planners to keep this role 
to a minimum with regard to substantive patent matters. 91 Th e experience of the 
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 92  See  J  Griffiths ,  ‘ Constitutionalising or Harmonising  – the Court of Justice, the Right 
to Property and European Copyright Law ’ ( 2013 )  38  European Law Review  65 ; and 
 L  Mcdonagh ,  ‘ From Brand Performance to Consumer Performativity: Assessing European 
Trade Mark Law aft er the Rise of Anthropological Marketing ’ ( 2015 )  42  Journal of Law and 
Society  611 – 636 . 
 93  < https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/588948/
Th e_United_Kingdoms_exit_from_and_partnership_with_the_EU_Web.pdf > . 
 94  < https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2017/uk/uk-government-appoints-new-ip-
minister > . 
CJEU ’ s expansive interventions in the areas of trade mark law and copyright law 
within the EU may have had an infl uence in this respect. 92 
 It is here that UK Prime Minister Th eresa May ’ s recent speech on Brexit  – 
she reiterated her vow that the UK would, post-Brexit, escape the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)  – becomes important. 
Furthermore, the same claim is made in the Government ’ s Brexit White Paper. 93 
 If the UK is indeed intent on a hard Brexit it is diffi  cult to see how the UK 
could participate in the UPC, which requires accepting that the decisions of 
the Court of Justice  – in patent law, at least  – will be binding with respect to 
UPC decisions enforceable in the UK. Yet in November 2016, several months 
aft er the EU referendum result, the UK Government announced that the UK 
would ratify the UPC Agreement aft er all. Furthermore, in January 2017, a mere 
few days prior to May ’ s speech, the new UK Minister for Intellectual Property, 
Jo Johnson, stated that the UK still intends to participate in the UPC, emphasising 
that the UPC is an international court rather than an EU one. 94 Th e UPC is now 
expected to be up and running by December 2017 or thereaft er in 2018. 
 Th ough the decision to go for the twin strategy of a hard Brexit while 
maintaining UPC ratifi cation at fi rst appears to make little sense, on further 
contemplation there may actually be some method behind it. In its Brexit White 
Paper, the Government suggests that the creation of new dispute resolution 
panels or tribunals will be necessary to determine questions arising out of 
whatever agreement the UK and EU reach upon Brexit. Th e point made by 
Jo Johnson about the UPC being an international court, not an EU one, may not 
be mere rhetoric  – it may indicate that the UK is willing to accept the jurisdiction 
of international courts or tribunals, like the UPC, to determine specifi c legal 
questions  – for example, patent matters  – that are common to the UK and its 
 ‘ new partnership with the European Union ’ (as referred to in the Brexit White 
Paper). 
 In this respect, the UK Government may consider that although the UPC is 
bound by rulings of the CJEU on a number of EU-related patent matters  – and 
UPC decisions on patent injunctions and revocations will be binding within 
the UK  – this is a very diff erent situation from that that currently exists under 
the sweeping jurisdiction of the CJEU, whose decisions can have the eff ect of 
immediately changing UK domestic law in a wide range of diff erent areas. 
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 95  M  Mimler ,  ‘ United Kingdom ’ in  P  Chrocziel ,  M  Lorenz and  W  Prinz zu Waldeck 
und Pyrmont (eds),  Intellectual Property and Competition Law ,  Kluwer Law International , 
 Th e Netherlands  2016 ,  p 129 . 
 96  Article 2(1) Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application 
of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of 
technology transfer agreements [2014] OJ L93/17. 
 If this is the UK Government ’ s view, then UK UPC ratifi cation makes a lot 
more sense. Indeed, the UK may even see the UPC as a model for the kind 
of specialist commercial court  – maintaining a direct but limited link with the 
CJEU and the wider EU economy  – that it would be willing to tolerate in its 
purported new  ‘ partnership ’ with the EU. Of course, we do not know whether 
the EU would be willing to accept these kinds of bespoke arrangements, but the 
UK ’ s own intentions may be becoming a bit clearer. 
 One fi nal point: the fate of the UK ’ s continued participation in the unitary 
patent scheme remains less certain. Th e UP, unlike the UPC, is created by an 
EU Regulation, and there is no way to consider it a purely  ‘ international right ’ 
(although the existing EP granted by the EPO would fi t this defi nition). Accepting 
the UP would require a more extensive assessment of EU law and as yet the UK 
Government has not given any clues as to its intentions. It remains possible that 
the UK  – post-Brexit  – will stay within the UPC but not the UP. A UK exit from 
the UP while UPC membership is maintained would mean that UP protection 
would not apply in the UK, but EPs valid in the UK could be litigated at the UPC. 
 2.6.  THE INTERFACE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND COMPETITION LAW 
 Th e ramifi cations of Brexit on IP law actually go beyond pure issues of 
intellectual property. Th e reason is that the interface between competition law 
and intellectual property is of practical importance with regards to the exercise 
and enforcement of IP rights (which by their nature are exclusive rights that can 
be used against competitors). EU law is of utmost relevance here since the EU 
has competence to legislate in the area of competition law, as deemed necessary 
for the functioning of the internal market pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. In 
addition, the substantive provisions within the UK Competition Act 1998 are 
based on the competition law provisions within the TFEU. 95 
 Th e two main provisions with regards to competition law, Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU, have been applied to sanction certain anti-competitive behaviours 
of IP right holders. Article 101, for instance, prohibits restrictive agreements 
that could prevent, restrict or distort competition within the internal market. In 
order not to sanction benefi cial agreements with regards to technology transfer, 
the EU Commission provides technology transfer block exemption regulations 
which specify which agreements would not fall foul of Article 101 TFEU. 96 
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Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in the market. Th is 
can, for instance occur, where an undertaking that has a dominant position on 
the market refuses to license an IP right to a competitor. 97 
 Brexit would mean that the links to the EU  acquis would be severed subject 
to any transitional arrangements. Th erefore, the impact of Brexit on this utterly 
 ‘ European ’ fi eld of law and its impact on the interface of intellectual property and 
competition law in the UK remains to be seen. A key question that arises with 
regards to IP practice is the future of so-called Euro-Defences. Such defences 
could be applied by a defendant in an IP infringement case arguing that a 
positive fi nding of infringement could be a violation of the principles enshrined 
within Article 101 or 102 TFEU. 98 Such defences are oft en brought forward in 
cases surrounding standard essential patents (patents essential to a technological 
standard). 99 Brexit would undermine the rationale of such defences as stemming 
from the TFEU. Owing to the similarity of the Chapter I and II prohibitions 
within the Competition Act 1998 100 with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU a similar 
application in future could be applied. Th erefore, it can be expected that UK 
competition law practice would closely follow developments within EU practice. 
 2.7. EXHAUSTION 
 Finally, Brexit would place the doctrine of exhaustion under new scrutiny. 
As mentioned, IP rights have the potential to impede freedom movement of 
goods under Article 34 TFEU. In order to prevent IP rights from impairing 
this fundamental principle, it was held that once a product has been placed 
on the market with the IP right holder ’ s consent, he or she is prevented from 
restricting any further circulation, ie the rights are exhausted. 101 Importantly, 
this principle also applies to all states within the EEA pursuant to Protocol 28 
of the EEA Agreement. Th erefore, the current framework presents itself as a 
system of regional exhaustion where IP rights are no longer enforceable once 
they have been put onto the market in the EEA by the right holder, subject to 
certain exceptions. 
 Th is current system has been criticised since it prevents EU Member 
States from applying a diff erent system of exhaustion. 102 Soft  Brexit, hence 
 97  Joined Cases C-241/91P and C-242/91P ,  Radio Telefi s Eireann v Commission (Magill) , 
 ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 . 
 98  M imler, above n 95, 129. 
 99  eg  IPCom v Nokia [ 2012 ]  EWHC 1446 (Ch). 
 100  Competition Act 1998, sections 2 – 16 and sections 18 – 24. 
 101  Case 16-74 ,  Centrafarm BV et Adriaan de Peijper v Winthrop BV ,  ECLI:EU:C:1974:115 . 
 102  With regards to trade marks:  Case C-355/96 ,  Silhouette International Schmied GmbH  & Co 
KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft  mbH ,  ECLI:EU:C:1998:374 . 
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EEA membership, would not alter the application of the current EU doctrine 
of exhaustion in the UK. In the case of a hard Brexit, however, the UK could 
prevent the importation of goods that were put onto the market within the EEA; 
alternatively, the UK could apply principles of international exhaustion, which 
would permit the importation of goods that have been placed onto the market 
anywhere in the world. Th e specifi c framework, however, will depend on the 
outcome of the Brexit negotiations. 
 3. CONCLUSION 
 Th ere are myriad challenges in untangling the UK from EU intellectual property 
law. Th e most pressing concern for UK IP holders will be the loss of the EU 
Intellectual Property Offi  ce at Alicante, which registers EU trade marks and 
registered designs. To ensure continuity in the protection of trade marks and 
designs, a new regime to convert existing EU rights into UK rights will likely 
be required, which could stretch the resources of the UK Intellectual Property 
Offi  ce. For the other major rights  – copyright and patents  – the crucial issues are 
only of slightly less consequence. Copyright lawyers will be watching in earnest 
to see if the UK legislates to mirror EU-rights such as the artist ’ s resale right 
and the  sui generis database right, and will be keenly observing how UK judges 
interpret EU-derived tests for concepts such as originality and parody in a post-
Brexit environment. In the patent context, all eyes are on the Unifi ed Patent 
Court and the Unitary Patent, as the UK intends, as of March 2017, to continue 
to play a major part in Europe ’ s new reformed patent litigation system. Yet, 
even if the UK is willing, it cannot be taken for granted that the EU will allow 
the UK, soon to be a non-Member State, to participate in a system specifi cally 
tailored with the EU single market in mind. Th ere is no doubt that Brexit will be 
a headache for IP owners and legislators, but it also promises to be a fascinating 
process. 
 
